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1. Introduction
Alchian (1984) and Furubotn (1985, 1988) have argued that in a world of informational
asymmetries between self interested employers and employees, and the risk of post-
contractual opportunism, effective co-operation may be advantageous to both parties. In
this context they emphasize the importance of firm specific skills and investments: Wor-
kers who undertake "durable reliance investments" (Furubotn 1985: 167) that are in the
interests of the worker and the firm alike commit themselves to the firm for some time
into the future and are therefore vulnerable. If workers are not protected by institutional
or contractual safeguards against "opportunistic behavior" by other members of the co-
alition, they will be either unwilling to invest in the acquisition of firm specific skills and
may risk serious economic loss in the case of dismissal. In a situation where not all of the
coalition-specific resources are owned by a single party, co-determination is likely to be a
type of governance structure that is capable of dealing with maximizing agents having
conflicting interests. Irrespective of this generally favorable view of voluntary co-
determination, legal intervention by the state is rejected:
"(E)fforts by goverment to ... reshape the firm have not led to particularly desirable re-
sults. The approach taken has emphasized the ´political´ aspect of the firm and the impor-
tance of corporate governance while failing to give much attention to broader economic
issues and to the relation between the firm´s total property-rights structure and its perfor-
mance. By granting workers major control rights without regard to their actual invest-
ment position in the firm, state programs have violated an important rule for ensuring ra-
tional allocation - namely, the rule that those making decisions should bear the full costs
of the decisions they make. This defect, together with the costly system used to appor-
tion the firm´s quasi rents between workers and stockholders, means that the orthodox
co-determined firm does not possess a truly efficient organizational structure" (Furubotn
1988: 178).
More generally, in their seminal paper published nearly twenty years ago, Jensen and
Meckling (1979: 474) argued that for a very simple reason mandated co-determination
must be detrimental to stockholder-value: "If co-determination is beneficial to both
stockholders and labor, why do we need laws which force firms to engage in it? Surely,
they would do so voluntarily. The fact that stockholders must be forced by law to accept
co-determination is the best evidence we have that they are adversely affected by it".
This view has however been challenged by Levine and Tyson (1990) who argue that co-
determination is likely to be underprovided by the market: In a typical prisoner´s di-
lemma, all firms would benefit if they introduced worker participation but co-determined3
firms require - among other things - a compressed wage structure to encourage "group
cohesiveness" and dismissal protection to lengthen the time horizon of workers.
Traditional firms on the other hand motivate their employees through the fear of dis-
missal and a sharply differentiated wage structure. It is highly unlikely that under such
circumstances a participative equilibrium will emerge: The viability of a single co-
determined firm will be threatened by adverse selection (it will attract the less motivated
job-seekers) and externality (its best workers will be poached by traditional firms which
can pay more). Hence the market will be systematically biased against co-determined
workplaces and the economy will be locked in a socially suboptimal position. Mandated
co-determination would overcome this dilemma by requiring all firms to introduce
participatory machinery1.
Given these incompatible positions, theory gives no guidance as to the likely effects of
mandated co-determination. The beneficial or detrimental effects of co-determination
ought therefore to be demonstrated empirically. The following paper tries to track the
impact of court decisions which extend or rescind employees´ co-determination on the
stock prizes of the firms concerned.
2. The Legal Environment
In this paper the term "co-determination" is used to describe labor representation on cor-
porate boards, i.e. participation of labor (employees; union representatives) in the entre-
preneurial decision-making of the board ("Unternehmensmitbestimmung"). Co-determi-
nation in this sense does not encompass participation by a works council, i.e. labor repre-
sentation at the plant-level ("betriebliche Mitbestimmung").
German corporate law distinguishes between the management board and the supervisory
board (two-tier or dual boards system as opposed to the Anglo-American one-tier
system). Co-determination refers to the representation of employees on the supervisory
board. The supervisory board appoints the members of the managing board (generally for
five years) and may dismiss them, though only for cause. It is responsible for monitoring
the management, although practically it acts as an advisory committee rather than as a
monitoring panel except in times of financial difficulty. To accomplish its duties, the
board has the right to receive comprehensive information. Management must report to it
                                                       
1 In a similar model, Freeman and Lazear (1995) analyze the efficiency properties of works coun-
cils. They argue that although the works council is likely to increase the joint surplus of the enterprise
(as a result of information exchange, consultation and participation) the firm´s profits are nonetheless
expected to be lower in the presence of a works council. Therefore, management will either oppose the
installation of a works council or vest it with too little power. For this reason, the institution has to be
mandated by government to reach a (potential) Pareto-optimum.4
periodically on all important questions, and the supervisory board reviews the financial
reports and balance sheets of the firm. The board may require management to obtain its
prior approval before entering into certain important transactions.
There are three different systems of labor participation on corporate boards. The one-
third participation model for corporations with more than 500 employees; the full-parity
model for coal and steel companies; and the quasi-parity co-determination for
corporations with more than 2.000 workers.
Under the "Industrial Constitution Act" (Betriebsverfassungsgesetz) of 1952, one third
of the members of the supervisory boards of stock corporations and limited liability
companies with more than 500 employees is appointed by the employees and two thirds
by the shareholders. The clear majority of voting power is hence held by the
shareholders´ representatives, putting the employees´ representatives in a mere
counselling position. In firms (corporations and limited liability companies) in the mining
and steel industries with more than 1.000 employees, the supervisory board consists of at
least eleven members (up to a maximum of 21, depending on the size of the firm). On
boards with 11 members five are appointed by the employees (of them, three by the
unions), five are elected by the shareholders, and a further "neutral" member (with a
casting vote) is appointed by the majority of both sides of the supervisory board.
The third model is based on the 1976 Co-determination Statute. In corporations and limi-
ted liability companies outside the iron and coal industries with more than 2.000 em-
ployees, half the members are elected by the shareholders; the other half is elected by the
employees and the trade unions. For instance, in a firm with not more than 10.000 em-
ployees shareholders will elect six, the employees (blue and white collar as well as lower-
ranking management) four, and the trade unions two members, the highest number of all
members on the board of the biggest firms being 20. If there is a stalemate in a vote by
the board (a rare event), the chairman who is elected by the shareholders, rather than by
the employees, has a casting vote. Because of this slight superiority of the shareholders
this model is usually described as "quasi-parity co-determination".
The Co-determination Act of 1976 has been challenged by single firms and employers´
associations on constitutional grounds. But the Federal Constitutional Court, in its deci-
sion of March 1st, 1979, found no merits in the claims of the complainants and rejected
their contentions. Apart from this basic decision there has been a number of decisions by
courts of all levels (state and federal) on co-determination issues. Parties to those5
disputes comprised the employees´ representatives or unions on one side and the
respective firms, shareholders´ or employers´ associations on the other. These court-
rulings may be understood and categorized as either extending or restricting co-
determination although in a formal sense, courts simply apply and interpret pre-existing
statute law. But if there were no different estimates of the outcomes of these judgements
the litigant parties would very likely neither bring nor defend actions. Our question is
whether, and to what extent, the stock market reacts to these court-rulings.
3. Former Studies
Table 1 contains a detailed summary of the limited number of studies that analyze the in-
fluence of the Co-determination Act on the economic performance of German firms.
Using rather different data and test designs, Svejnar (1981, 1982), Benelli et al. (1987),
FitzRoy and Kraft (1993) and Gurdon and Rai (1990) conclude that the introduction of
the Co-determination Acts of 1951 and 1976 had a rather modest - if any - influence on
the sectors and firms affected. The main weakness of these studies is not so much their
rather small sample sizes, but the fact that they concentrate on one single event, i.e. the
introduction of the Co-determination Act, without taking into consideration that at least
the latter of these two Acts had been anticipated by firms (and potential investors) since
the late 1960s and early 1970s. The study by Benelli et al. (1987) is the only one that ta-
kes a longer run view, but it uses annual and monthly stock return variances, which are
likely to underestimate the influence of a single event. As Brown and Warner (1985) ha-
ve shown, daily stock return data are especially suitable for event studies: Despite their
potentially problematic characteristics, such as variance increases and unusually high
autocorrelation, daily data generally present few difficulties in the context of event study
methodologies. Thus, research strategies based on the OLS market model and using
standard parametric tests are usually well-specified under a variety of conditions.Table 1
Productivity Effects of Codetermination
Author(s) Sample/Data Productivity Measure(s) Indicator(s) of CD* Effect of CD*
Benelli et al. (1987) 8 two-digit manufacturing Annual Stock Introduction of Although not statistically significant,
industries 1954-1976 Return Variances Codetermination Act the return variances are lower in
1951 industries subject to parity codeter-
mination than in other industries. This
pattern is not observed in other Euro-
pean countries.
40 codetermined and 18 Three Different Introduction of The return variance of the portfolio of
non-codetermined firms Monthly Portfolio Codetermination Act codetermined firms declines signifi-
1973-1983 Return Variances 1976 cantly following the imposition of co-
Jan. 1973-Dec. 1977 vs. determination. Since the same pheno-
Jan. 1978-April 1983 menon occurs in firms not subject to
codetermination, the imposition of the
law had apparently no discernible im-
pact on the stock return variance.
40 codetermined and 18 Average Monthly Stock Introduction of In the case of firms directly affected
non-codetermined firms Return Jan. 1975-June 1976 Codetermination Act by codetermination, average monthly
1973-1983 1976 stock returns decreased by 0.008%
during the period immediately prece-
ding its imposition; in the case of
non-codetermined firms the respective
decline was even larger (0.013%). This
difference was not statistically signi-
ficant.
(continued)Benelli et al. (1987) 42 matched pairs of Earnings Before Interest Introduction of There is no evidence at all that
firms (codetermined and Taxes/Total Assets Codetermination Act codetermination affects firm policies:
and non-codetermined) Net Income/Total Equity 1976 Using parametric and non-parametric
1970-1976 vs. 1977-1982 Dividends/Net Income test procedures, the authors find that
Total Debt/Total Assets none of the mean comparison tests
Long-term Debt/Total produced statistically significant re-
Assets sults.
Current Assets/Total
Assets
(Current Assets - Inven-
tories)/Short-term Debt
Net Investment in Fixed
Assets/Total Assets
Labor Costs/Total Sales
FitzRoy/Kraft (1993) 68 large and codetermined Value Added per Emp- Introduction of Significantly higher in codetermined
vs. 44 smaller and non-co- loyee Codetermination Act firms in 1975, but not in 1983
determined firms, 1975 and Total Labor Costs per 1976 Significantly higher in codetermined
1983, publicly traded, metal Employee firms in both years
industry only Return on Equity (Pre-tax Difference between codetermined and
Accounting Profits/ non codetermined firms insignificant
Equity Capital) in both years
Total Factor Productivity Significantly lower in codetermined
Growth 1975-1983 firms
Gurdon/Rai (1990) 63 large enterprises Stock Value of Plant and Introduction of The capital-labor ratio increased
(37 affected and 26 Equipment/Number of Codetermination Act significantly more in firms that were
unaffected by Codeter- Employees 1976 not affected by 1976 legislation. The
mination Act 1976) Change in Revenue per introduction of legislation led to a
1970-1985 Unit of Labor significantly lower productivity and a
Change in Profits per significantly higher profitability
Unit of Capital in codetermined firms.
(continued)Svejnar (1981) 3 two-digit manufacturing Relative Hourly Earnings Introduction of Following the introduction of the Co-
industries, 1935-1938 and in Iron/Steel and Coal Codetermination Act determination Act, hourly earnings
1949-1976 Mining compared to Tex- 1951 are significantly higher in the iron and
tiles steel industry compared with the textile
industry, but not in coal mining,
although both industries are heavily
unionized compared to the reference
industry, where the Act was not intro-
duced.
Svejnar (1982) 14 two-digit manufacturing Value Added per Hour Introduction of In general, the establishment of code-
industries 1950-1976 Worked by Production Codetermination Act termination through the 1951, 1952,
Workers 1951 and of Works and 1972 laws had no perceptible ef-
Constitution Acts fect on productivity. In mining, 1972
1952 and 1972 legislation had a significantly negative
productivity effect; in iron and steel,
none of the three laws had a signifi-
cant impact.
* CD: Codetermination9
Moreover, tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix contain an overview of the equally small but
recently increasing number of studies analyzing the influence of supplementary forms of
workers´ representation, i.e. unionism and works councils, on the economic performance of
sectors and firms. In these studies, sectoral as well as company performance is usually
measured by a variety of indicators, including productivity levels and growth, financial
performance including profitability, investment in human and physical capital as well as in
research and development, and job generation. Most studies on the influence of trade unions
report negative, but statistically insignificant coefficients of union density on some
productivity measure (usually value added, total factor productivity or gross domestic
product per employee). A comparative analysis of studies looking at the impact of works
councils on productivity cannot support comprehensive conclusions about the effect of
workers' representation either (for a detailed evaluation Frick 1995). The variability of
findings across studies using differing definitions of variables, specifications, time periods,
industries and levels of aggregation does not allow us to conclude that there is an effect,
much less specify its direction and magnitude (Belman 1992: 58). Thus, to the extent that a
clear pattern does emerge from the empirical studies we find that co-determination does not
have pronounced economic consequences one way or another (Hodgson/Jones 1989).
There are several reasons why the results of these studies are controversial and in-
conclusive. Firstly it is apparently very difficult to isolate the productivity effects of sectoral
as well as plant-level representation because an analytical approach requires large long-
itudinal samples with a large number of independent variables. Secondly there are other
methodological problems which have not been solved yet. The most important are, first, the
assumption of identical production functions in firms with and without unions/works
councils and second, the problem of endogeneity of workers´ representation.
4. The Own Approach
Given the shortcomings of the studies quoted and summarized above, we will pursue a
different path and use the methodology of event studies (Thompson 1995, Brown/Warner
1980): In a first step we will use daily stock return data from 28 different firms that were
subject to court decisions concerning the application of the Co-determination Act during the
period Jan. 1, 1974 - Dec. 31, 1995 to analyze the impact of co-determination on the stock
price of the respective firms. In a second step, we ask whether the rather surprising finding
that the stock market did not react in a significant way can be reconciled with the
assumption that for potential investors co-determination is - at least in the German context -
not a signal of considerable importance. We ask, first, whether the Introduction of the Co-
determination Act and second, the ruling of the Federal Constitutional Court that the Act is10
compatible with the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany, had any influence on
the performance of those sectors most heavily affected by the decision, as due to the Act´s
perceived influence and the long discussion preceeding its introduction, single court decis-
ions may be of minor importance only.
Thus our empirical design combines longitudinal and cross-sectional analyses: On the one
hand we study the influence of 23 distinct events (judicial decisions) that occured over a pe-
riod of more than twenty years on the price development of the shares of the respective
companies and on the other hand we analyze the impact of only two events (the introduc-
tion of the Co-determination Act in 1976 and the final ruling of the Federal Constitutional
Court regarding the appeal against the main provisions of that Act in 1979) on the stock
market performance of six different sectors of the German economy.
4.1. Data and Methods
The stock market indices we use have been compiled in the "German Finance Data Base"
(Bühler/Göppl/Möller 1993). The calculation of the global index, the so-called DAFOX, is
based on all those stocks that have been traded in the official market on the Frankfurt Stock
Exchange since January 1974. During our period of investigation (mid 1970s to mid 1990s),
the number of securities traded remained relatively constant at about 200 for a considerable
time and then increased to about 350. The DAFOX is constructed as a "hypothetic
portfolio", i.e. the index value at the date of the index calculation represents the value of a
portfolio which is composed exactly like the index. The DAFOX uses a variant of the
Laspeyres price index formula, incorporating a chain factor for the rearrangement of index
weights and the rebalancing of the index portfolio. Moreover, it includes an adjustment
factor for cash distributions, representing cash dividends and capital changes2. The daily
index values are computed using daily spot prices from the official price fixing at 12:30
p.m., which are weighted by the number of shares outstanding. Apart from the overall
index, two market indices (for "blue chips" and "small caps") and twelve industry indices are
calculated by the same method (Göppl/Schütz 1993, 1994).
In order to analyze stock market reactions to decisions made by the courts, we calculate
abnormal and cumulated abnormal returns for single firms that were either taken to court by
the respective industry union for not fulfilling their legal obligations, or that took the
initiative and went to court to reject the union´s claims. Apart from the fact that the time
period under consideration is much longer regarding the analysis of market reactions to the
                                                       
2 Göppl and Schütz (1994: 20-35) compare the suitability of the DAFOX with the efficiency of other
stock market indices that are available for Germany on a daily basis and find that the efficiency hypothesis
has to be rejected for all but one of the other indices, but not for the DAFOX.11
introduction of the Co-determination Act, the same procedure is also applied there. The
abnormal return is calculated as follows:
(1) ARit = Rit - Rmt
where ARit: abnormal return of sector (firm) i at time t,
Rit: return of sector (firm) i at time t,
Rmt: return of the whole stock market at time t.
The cumulated abnormal return is the sum of all abnormal returns during the period under
investigation:
T
(2) CARt = ￿ ARt
t=1
N
where ARt = ￿ ARit
1
The abnormal and cumulated abnormal returns prior to, and after the change in, legislation
and/or the publication of the judicial decision will be compared using a T-test.
Apart from the abnormal return, investors are interested in the risk of a specific stock:
When choosing between different options, persons (and institutional investors, such as
banks) prefer investments that - given the same level of risk - yield higher returns or - given
the same return - are less risky. The risk associated with a specific stock consists of a
systematic and an unsystematic risk. With "systematic risk" we mean risks that cannot be
reduced by a (further) diversification of the portfolio, i.e. risks that are specific to the
market. A measure of the systematic risk is the so-called "beta-factor": It measures the ex-
tent to which the variation of the price of a single stock is correlated with the variation of
the overall stock market. A value of one indicates that there is a perfect correlation between
the sector´s (firm´s) development and the development of the overall market. A value of
more (less) than one implies that the variation of the sector´s (firm´s) stock price over-
(under-)reacts to developments in the general stock market (Bühner 1996).
The beta-factor is calculated as follows:
￿ (Rit - Ri) * (Rmt - Rm)
(3) betaiT =
￿ (Rmt - Rm)212
where betaiT: beta-factor for sector (firm) i at time t,
Rit: return of sector (firm) i at time t,
Rmt: market return at time t,
Ri: average return of sector (firm) i during the period t = 1 ... T
Rm: average market return in the period t = 1 ... T,
T: period under investigation.
The unsystematic risk is specific to the sector or the firm, i.e. it is independent of the market
and is usually called the "residual volatility". By this term we mean variations in the returns
of a sector´s or firm´s stocks that cannot be explained by variations in the market return.
High values of the volatility measure therefore point to the existence of sector (firm)
specific factors which influence the return. Our measure of residual volatility is calculated as
follows (Bühner 1996):
_________________
(4) diuT = ￿diT
2 - betaiT
2 * dmt
2
where diuT: residual volatility of sector (firm) i in the period T,
diT
2: variance of the stock return of sector (firm) i in period T,
betaiT
2: beta-factor of sector (firm) i in period T,
dmt
2: variance of the market return in period T,
T: period under investigation.
The latter two measures are calculated for the two sub-periods (prior to and after the publi-
cation of a judicial decision) in order to test whether the systematic as well as the un-
systematic risk are influenced by the above mentioned events. Once again we perform T-
tests to confirm or reject the null hypothesis, that the events do not have any influence (for a
similar research strategy Bühner 1996, Gehrke/Garz/Oerke 1995).
4.2. Empirical Findings
4.2.1.Court Decisions and Shareholder Value
Between Jan. 1, 1954 and Dec. 31, 1995 German courts decided 46 cases concerning the
application of the Co-determination Act and the Act regulating co-determination in the
mining and iron and steel industry. Our sample however, consists of 28 enterprises only
because six of the cases under consideration were decided prior to Jan. 1, 1974, which is the
date from whence daily stock return data has been available. Moreover, sixteen of the 46
decisions affected stock corporations which have either never been traded or which were
not yet being traded at the time the court made its decision. In one case a shareholders´ as-13
sociation went to court instead of a single enterprise. This leaves us with 23 court decisions
affecting 28 enterprises because in one case six enterprises - together with 29 employers´
associations - lodged a joint appeal to the Federal Constitutional Court (see Table A3 in the
Appendix for a list of the companies affected).
Table 2
Structural characteristics of the decisions under consideration
decision extends co-determination 14
partly extending/partly restricting 4
decision restricts co-determination 10
company wins/union looses 10
both parties win/loose equally 8
company looses/union wins 10
relating to single enterprise 7
industry-wide importance 21
Court of First Instance 9
Appellate Court 10
Federal Civil Court 3
Federal Constitutional Court# 6
# One decision affecting six different companies
Table 2 reveals that in fourteen of the 28 cases the court decision can be classified as "ex-
tending" co-determination, while in ten cases the decision resulted in a "restriction". In four
cases an unambiguous classification was not possible. In ten cases the company won the
lawsuit, in ten cases it lost and in the remaining eight cases both parties had to give up their
initial positions to more or less the same extent. The cases in which firms lost and the cases
in which co-determination was extended are not coextensive as the classification as "lost"
refers to the result of the decision whereas the classification as "extensive" looks at its
content (the general wording of a decision may be "extensive" whereas in the specific case
the company may still have won). About 75% of all lawsuits were of industry- or even
economy-wide importance, while only 25% affected just one single enterprise. In nine cases
the lawsuit was decided by a court of first instance, in ten cases by an Appelate Court and in
the remaining nine either by the Federal Civil Court (n=3) or by the Federal Constitutional
Court (n=6).
The empirical findings will be presented in the following order: First, we look at the abnor-
mal returns on the event days, i.e. the day the respective judicial decision was issued. Se-
cond, we compare the short-run development of cumulated abnormal returns in the ten days14
before and after the single events3 and third, we present empirical findings based on an
analysis of variance and regression estimates of the influence of the type of the decision
reached (extension vs. restriction of co-determination) and the outcome of the court´s
deliberations (firm´s win vs. loss).
Figure 1 shows that the average abnormal return on the event day is slightly positive, which
is rather surprising, given the fact that the number of cases where co-determination rights
were extended by the courts is larger than the number of cases where these rights were res-
tricted (14 vs. 10). Looking at Figures 2-3 it appears that an extension of co-determination
rights went together with a slight, but statistically insignificant increase in abnormal returns
whereas a restriction went hand in hand with a decrease that also proved to be insignificant.
Since the development of the abnormal returns is rather erratic and shows no discernible
pattern, the cumulative abnormal returns are also, first, rather low and, second, not
systematically related to the type of decision.
A similar picture emerges if we look at Figures 4-5: Neither does a company´s success in
the respective lawsuit lead to a significant increase of the abnormal return on either the
event day or one of the following days, nor does a company loss have the opposite impact
on the development of the relative capital market performance of the companies affected.
Using the (cumulated) abnormal return as a dependent variable we estimated several OLS-
regressions with the outcome of the respective court´s deliberations (either the firm wins,
the employees´ representatives win or no party wins), the basic character of the decision
(restriction or extension of co-determination or compromise), the type of court
involved(court of first instance, Appellate Court, Federal Civil Court or Federal Constitu-
tional Court) and the relevance of the decision (affecting a single enterprise only or eco-
nomy-wide importance) serving as independent variables (for a formal presentation of the
models estimated see the Technical Appendix).
                                                       
3 The size of the event window does not have any influence on the empirical findings. We experimented
with periods prior to and following the respective events of 60 days, 40 days, 30 days, 20 days and 10 days
respectively. This left the findings absolutely unchanged.15
Figure 1
The Short-Term Development of the Average Abnormal
and Cumulated Abnormal Return
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Figure 2
The Short-Term Development of the Average (Cumulated) Abnormal Return
if Codetermination is Extended
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Figure 3
The Short-Term Development of the Average (Cumulated) Abnormal Return
if Codetermination is Restricted
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Figure 4
The Short-Term Development of the Average (Cumulated) Abnormal Return
in the Case of a Firm Win
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Figure 5
The Short-Term Development of the Average (Cumulated) Abnormal Return
in the Case of a Firm Loss
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Table 3
The Influence of Structural Characteristics of the Court Decision on the Abnormal Return
Variable B SE B T
UNWIN -0.171 .486 -0.352 +
NOWIN 0.441 .731 0.604 +
EXTENS 0.963 .599 1.609 +
PARTLY 0.031 .659 0.047 +
FIRSTIN 0.704 .806 0.873 +
APPELC 1.340 .743 1.884 *
FEDCIV 0.350 .855 0.409 +
SINGLE 0.335 .538 0.623 +
CONST -1.145 .928 -1.234 +
Adj R2 * 100 10,7 %
F-Value 1.39 +
N of Cases 28
* significantly different at p<.10
+ not significantly different at p<.10
Looking at Tables 3 and 4, it appears that in no case the independent variables had a sta-
tistically significant impact on the capital market´s reactions4. If the employees or unions
win the trial instead of the firm (UNWIN), the abnormal as well as the cumulated abnormal
return is negative, though not significantly different from zero. A court decision that balan-
ces the parties conflicting positions (NOWIN) leads to a positive, but also insignificant (cu-
mulated) abnormal return. The same is true with regard to the basic character of the
decision: Although an extension of co-determination (EXTENS) has a positive influence on
the abnormal and a negative one on the cumulated abnormal return, both coefficients are
not significantly different from zero; this general finding also appears in cases where both
parties have to give up their initial positions to roughly the same extent (PARTLY). More-
over, apart from one notable exception (APPELC in Table 3), neither the institutional
importance of the court involved nor the differing impact/relevance of the respective decisi-
ons proved to have any influence on the capital market performance of the firms affected by
judicial decisions concerning the application of the Co-determination Act5.
                                                       
4 Since the number of cases is rather low (n=28) a single outlier may have a strong influence on the
results of the estimates presented above. Therefore we recoded our dependent variables as  dummy-variables
(negative vs. positive (cumulated) abnormal return) and estimated logistic regressions with the same
explanatory variables as above. This left our findings virtually unchanged. For the sake of brevity we do not
report the results of these estimates, but they can be obtained from the authors on request.
5 Due to the rather small sample size we dropped firm characteristics (such as size, sector affiliation,
value added per employee, capital stock, etc.) as additional predictors of the (cumulated) abnormal rate of
return. Including these variables only leads to a reduction in the degrees of freedom without affecting the
coefficients presented in Table 3 and Table 4.19
Table 4
The Influence of Structural Characteristics of the Court Decision on the Cumulated
Abnormal Return
Variable B SE B T
UNWIN -4.024 2.431 -1.656 +
NOWIN 2.099 3.656 0.574 +
EXTENS -1.333 2.997 -0.445 +
PARTLY -2.111 3.300 -0.640 +
FIRSTIN 3.257 4.034 0.807 +
APPELC 0.390 3.717 1.450 +
FEDCIV 6.134 4.279 1.434 +
SINGLE -4.455 2.692 -1.655 +
CONST -0.615 4.644 -0.133 +
Adj R2 * 100 0,4 %
F-Value 0,99 +
N of Cases 28
+ not significantly different from zero at p<.10
Even if we "inflate" the degrees of freedom by pooling the data for the 28 enterprises over a
period of 21 days (ten days prior to the event plus the event day plus a period of ten days
following the event) in order to reduce the standard errors of our coefficients, the empirical
analysis does not produce statistically significant results (cf. Tables 5 and 6): As the findings
from an analysis of variance show, none of the explanatory variables is of any meaningful
importance, i.e. all of the variables are insignificant (Table 5) and the explanatory power of
the estimated model including all the relevant parameters is surprisingly low (0,7%; cf.
Table 6)6. Although the findings are not significant - and should therefore from a
statistician´s point of view not be interpreted - it is worth noting that the influence of an
extension of co-determination as well as the influence of a company win are both counter-
intuitive: Other things equal, an extension of co-determination leads to an increase of the
cumulated abnormal return while a company win leads to a decrease. At the same time, a
company loss leads c.p. to an (insignificant) increase, a restriction of co-determination rights
to a decrease of the cumulated abnormal return.
                                                       
6 These findings are absolutely unaffected by the number of days in the event window: Neither an
extension (to twenty days before and after the event, nor a restriction to five days prior and following the
event) had any discernible effect on the development of the stock prize.20
Table 5
Analysis of Variance of the Structural Characteristics of the Courts´ Decision on the
Cumulated Abnormal Return
Source of Sum of Mean
Variation Squares DF Square F
Main Effects 4.937 9 0.549 0.463+
OUTCOME 2.489 2 1.245 1.051+
DECISION  2.111 2 1.056 0.891+
TIME 1.285 2 0.643 0.543+
COURT 2.475 3 0.825 0.696+
Explained 4.937 9 0.549 0.463+
Residual 659.860 578 1.185
Total 664.797 587 1.175
+ not significantly different from zero at p<.10
Table 6
Multiple Classification Analysis of the Structural Characteristics of the Courts´ Decision on
the Cumulated Abnormal Return
Grand Mean .01
Adjusted for
Unadjusted Independents
Variable + Category N Dev'n Eta Dev'n Beta
Outcome
Extension 294 .01 .09
Partly/partly 84 .06 .16
Restriction 210 -.04 -.18
.03 .13
Decision
Company Loss 210 -.02 .06
Both win/loose 168 .04 .13
Company Win 210 -.01 -.15
.02 .11
Time
Before Event 280 -.04 -.04
Event Day 28 .16 .16
After Event 280 .02 .02
.04 .04
Type of Court
First Instance 189 .02 .12
Appelate Court 210 -.02 -.01
Fed. Civ. Court 63 .01 .05
Fed. Con. Court 126 .00 -.22
.02 .11
Multiple R Squared .007
Multiple R .08621
One can offer various explanations for these findings: First, we did not look at the anno-
uncement dates on which information about legal disputes or lawsuits was disseminated
through the press. The stock market may already have reacted on those dates rather than on
the date of judgment. That would mean that the stock market is better at forecasting and
anticipating the outcome of the judicial decision than the losing party. However, we did not
obtain the necessary data on this point. A second explanation is that the capital market did
not even obtain the information on the outcome of the judicial decisions. But this is not the
case as all judgments in our list were published in the legal press and in most, if not all
cases, in the general press. A further argument is as follows: The stock market does not
react because it considers the judicial decisions on co-determination issues as being of minor
importance. That could be either because co-determination is thought to influence the
performance of the firms concerned neither negatively nor positively. Or, if co-determinati-
on in general is considered to have an impact on performance, judicial decisions at least will
have no negative or positive effects as they will not restrict or extend co-determination
significantly beyond the range already demarcated by the statute itself.
4.2.2.Stock Market Reactions to Changes in the Legal Environment
If the latter interpretation were correct, we should observe significant capital market reac-
tions in periods during which the legal framework was enacted and/or has been subject to a
legal examination. Thus the following section uses sectoral stock market data to analyze the
influence of the enactment of the Co-determination Act (July 1st, 1976) and the final ruling
of the Federal Constitutional Court (March 1st, 1979) in which it considered the Act to be
constitutional. Even at the risk of increasing the noise in the data, we increase the number of
days in the event window to a considerable extent, because otherwise we would be unable
to detect long- or medium-term changes in investment behavior. It is very likely however,
that such changes (if at all) occured long before the enactment of the law because potential
investors anticipate possibly detrimental consequences of co-determination and thus re-
direct their investment behavior.
On the one hand, the selection of sectors to be analyzed can be justified with the respective
employers associations´ opposition to the Act: the appeal lodged with the Federal
Constitutional Court against the main provisions of the Co-determination Act (on June
29th, 1977) was supported by ten single firms (of which only six are traded at the stock
market7) and 29 employers´ associations from four sectors (banks and insurance companies,
                                                       
7 Three of these ten firms are not joint stock companies and one of them has - although quoted at the
stock exchange - never been publicly traded.22
chemical industry, engineering industry, steel production and manufacturing) of which three
were chosen for the empirical analysis. It seems reasonable to assume that firms from these
sectors were more in opposition to the new legislation, because the percentage of workers
covered by the Co-determination Act varies substantially between manufacturing industry,
which is characterized by predominantly large plants, and the service sector, where, apart
from banks and insurance companies, small- and medium-sized firms dominate. On the other
hand, we selected three sectors that were much less affected by the new legislation as
reference industries (construction, retail trade, and food, beverages and leisure services) to
which potential investors might have turned after the enactment of the new legislation.
For the specific purposes of this first empirical test, the advantages of an aggregated, i.e.
sectoral (cumulated) abnormal rate of return presumably outweigh the disadvantages: The
sectoral indices are calculated using the stock market performance of 20-50 publicly traded
firms from each sector. This is problematic insofar as not all publicly traded firms are
subject to co-determination and not all co-determined firms are publicly traded. Particularly
in the banking and insurance sector, but also in the chemical industry, the percentage of
employees working in co-determined and publicly traded firms is relatively high (70-80%),
whereas in the engineering industry it is about 50%8. In the three "reference industries" the
percentage of workers employed by firms subject to co-determination is less than 25%. It
seems reasonable to assume that in our specific context the aggregated indices are likely to
measure the "pure" effect of co-determination, because data on individual firms is - due to
enterprise specific factors - much "noisier". In other words: Sectoral performance measures
are probably better suited for longitudinal analyses such as the following one because firm
specific factors "disappear".
Turning to the empirical findings, it appears from table 7 that with only one exception neit-
her the enactment of the Co-determination Act, nor the fact that it was later on declared
constitutional by the Federal Constitutional Court resulted in a significant change in the
average abnormal rates of return in the six sectors under consideration.
• In the chemical industry the average abnormal return slightly decreased after the in-
troduction of the Co-determination Act on July 1st, 1976.
• In the banking and insurance sector as well as in the engineering industry the introducti-
on of the Act was accompanied by a small increase in the average abnormal rate of re-
turn.
• In two of the three reference industries (construction and food and leisure) a positive
average abnormal return turned into a negative one and in the third one (retail trade), a
                                                       
8 Own calculations based on unpublished data provided by the Federal Labor Office and on data from
Müller-Jentsch (1989: 194-195).23
positive average abnormal return became negative after the introduction of the Co-
determination Act.
Table 7
The Relative Stock Market Performance of Selected Sectors#
Period two and a half years before and ten days after the Enactment of the Co-determination Act (July
1st, 1976)
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Heavily Affected Sectors
Chemical Industry 0,022 (0,454) -0,074 (0,258) +
Banks and Insurances -0,008 (0,313) 0,054 (0,249) +
Engineering Industry 0,015 (0,507) 0,087 (0,435) +
Unaffected Sectors
Construction Industry -0,079 (0,699) 0,079 (0,548) +
Retail Trade 0,010 (0,681) -0,290 (0,620) +
Food and Leisure -0,050 (0,579) 0,111 (0,547) +
Period two and a half years before and ten days after the Federal Constitutional Court´s Final Decision
(March 1st, 1979)
Heavily Affected Sectors
Chemical Industry -0,022 (0,338) 0,187 (0,216) *
Banks and Insurances 0,006 (0,234) -0,031 (0,184) +
Engineering Industry 0,018 (0,274) -0,094 (0,138) +
Unaffected Sectors
Construction Industry 0,033 (0,512) -0,198 (0,435) +
Retail Trade -0,038 (0,595) 0,063 (0,735) +
Food and Leisure -0,014 (0,365) -0,044 (0,183) +
# Average abnormal return prior to and after the enactment of the law and the decision published on
March 1st, 1979.
+ Means not statistically different at p < .10
* significant at p < .10
• The final decision of the Federal Constitutional Court on March 1st, 1979 caused the
average abnormal rates of return to decrease in banking and insurance as well as in engi-
neering.
• In the chemical industry the latter event caused the abnormal rate of return to rise si-
gnificantly.
• In the industries selected for the purposes of a comparative institutional analysis, the
impact of the Federal Constitutional Court´s final decision was equally weak: In one case
a negative (positive) average abnormal return turned into a positive (negative) one and in
the remaining case a negative return remained negative.24
In summary, these findings are surprising insofar as the two events went hand in hand with
rather distinct developments in the industries under consideration: Among the three sectors
most heavily affected as well as among those more or less unaffected, there is one regarding
which the first event induced an increase in the average abnormal return and the latter a
decline. In each groups´ remaining two sectors the first event induced a decline and the
second an increase9.
However, with regard to the enactment of the law, even an event window of two and a half
years might be too short, because the political discussion about co-determination can be
traced back to the late 1960s. It is thus possible that shareholders who invested in the
sectors and firms later on most heavily affected by the new legislation experienced a reducti-
on in their abnormal returns long before the law came into force. Unfortunately, it is not
possible to test this hypothesis, because the stock market data is only available from January
2nd, 1974 onwards and because the second event occured less than three years after the
first10.
Since the means and standard deviations are likely to hide possible ups and downs in the
abnormal rates of return immediately before and after the critical events, we plot the respec-
tive values for each of the three sectors most heavily affected by the new Act (see Figures
6-11).
A closer look at the variation of the (cumulated) abnormal rates of return in the three sec-
tors most heavily affected reveals the following developments:
• In 1976, the development of the abnormal returns followed a rather erratic pattern in the
first five days following the enactment of the Co-determination Act: Although none of
the changes proved to be statistically significant, the abnormal returns were mostly
positive.
                                                       
9 We conducted a similar analysis with the date of the oral presentation at the Federal Constitutional
Court as the event date. Here too, the capital market´s reactions were statistically insignificant.
10 Since the performance of a specific stock can only be considered "normal" or "abnormal" relative to a
particular benchmark, it is necessary to test the stability of our findings by using alternative reference
indices. Although most reasonable indices will be very highly correlated with each other, this does not mean
that the exact composition is unimportant. Göppl and Schütz (1994: 26) for example show that the
correlation of the overall DAFOX with the DAFOX for blue chips is +.995 for the period January 1974-
December 1991. The respective coefficient for the overall DAFOX and the DAFOX for small caps is +.892
only and for the DAFOX for blue chips and the DAFOX for small caps it is +.846. However, when we
replicated our analysis using the DAFOX for small caps instead of the overall DAFOX, the results did not
change dramatically: Although in most cases the post-event performance was slightly lower than the pre-
event performance, the difference proved to be insignificant in every single case. The full results of the tests
are available from the authors on request.25
Figure 6: Capital Market Performance of the Banking and 
Insurance Sector, 1976
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Figure 7: Capital Market Performance of the Engineering 
Industry, 1976 
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Figure 8: Capital Market Performance of the Chemical Industry, 
1976
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Figure 9: Capital Market Performance of the Banking and 
Insurance Sector, 1979
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Figure 10: Capital Market Performance of the Engineering 
Industry, 1979
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Figure 11: Capital Market Performance of the Chemical Industry, 
1979
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• Looking at the development of the cumulative abnormal returns it appears that once
again no common pattern exists: In the banking and insurance sector and in the engi-
neering industry the cumulative abnormal returns were slightly higher at the end of the
period under investigation than they were in the beginning. In the chemical industry they
were slightly lower. However, in all three sectors the margins in which the cumulative
abnormal returns varied were rather small.
• In 1979, a similar picture emerges with respect to the development of the abnormal
returns in the first few days after the Federal Constitutional Court´s decision: In none of
the industries under consideration did the sector specific rate of return differ in a
statistically meaningful way from the market return. In the chemical industry the majority
of the abnormal rates of return within the "critical" five-day-period following the event
was slightly positive, in the remaining two sectors (banking and insurance, engineering)
they were negative.
• The cumulative abnormal rate of return showed a constant upward trend in the chemical
industry whereas in the remaining two sectors it showed a clear (engineering industry)
and a less clear downward trend (banking and insurances). In neither case, however, did
the cumulative abnormal rate of return exceed a margin of +2% or -1% respectively.
Further tests reveal that neither the enactment of the Co-determination Act nor its general
acceptance by the Federal Constitutional Court caused any significant changes in the beta-
factors nor in the volatility measures11.
5. Summary and Implications
Tracking a sample of judicial decisions concerning the application of the German Co-
determination Act of 1976 we did not find that stockholders experienced financial losses
due to judicial decisions extending co-determination rights of workers. Moreover, neither
the enactment of the Co-determination Act nor its legal examination by the Federal
Constitutional Court in 1979 led - according to our data - to significant reductions in the
(cumulated) abnormal returns in those sectors of the German economy, where most of the
firms must obey the respective legislation.
One can offer various explanations for our findings. As to the judicial decisions, we did not
look at the announcement dates on which information about legal disputes or lawsuits was
disseminated through the press. The stock market may have reacted on these dates rather
                                                       
11 With regard to the enactment of the law in 1976, the beta factors are 1.84 (before the event) and 2.20
(afterwards) in the chemical industry, 0.81 and 0.41 in the engineering industry and 1.89 and 0.42 in the
banking and insurance sector. None of these differences is statistically significant. At the same time, the
volatility measures are close to zero in every case and do not differ significantly either.29
than on the dates of the judgments. That would mean that the stock market is - on average -
better at forecasting and anticipating the outcome of the judicial decision than the losing
party. Further research should attempt to obtain these data and test this hypothesis.
A second explanation is that the stock market did not react because it considers the judicial
decisions on co-determination issues as being of minor importance. That could be because
judicial decisions are not thought to have negative or positive effects as they will not restrict
or extend co-determination significantly beyond the range already demarcated by the statute
itself. This hypothesis would have gained support if there had been significant capital market
reactions when the legal framework was enacted and/or when its constitutionality was
questioned. We did not however observe a significant change in the abnormal rates of return
of the sectors most heavily affected by the introduction of co-determination in 1976 as
compared with industries that are either not at all or only to a small extent affected by the
new legislation.
At this point one could end with the hypothesis that co-determination is thought to
influence the performance of the firms concerned neither negatively nor positively. Further
research should however, test yet another hypothesis: It may be that some investors (e.g.,
employees of the respective firms who are shareholders at the same time) are favourable
towards co-determination whereas others do not. In that case trading activities between
these two groups of shareholders may occur when co-determination is extended or
restricted by court decisions and thus might negative and positive effects be levelled out.
One could test for an increase in the number of securities traded while leaving the price
more or less unaffected. This finding could prove to be a serious challenge of the
assumption that all investors dislike co-determination. So far, none of the above cited
conflicting theoretical positions on the impact of co-determination on firm value receives
much empirical support.30
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Technical Appendix
1. Specification of the Models Underlying Tables 3 and 4
CAR or AR = b0 + b1 UNWIN + b2 NOWIN + b3 EXTENS + b4 PARTLY
+ b5 FIRSTIN + b6 APPELC + b7 FEDCIV + b8 SINGLE + e
where: CAR/AR: (cumulated) abnormal rate of return
UNWIN: union wins (no=0, yes=1)
NOWIN: no party wins, both have to make concessions (no=0, yes=1)
reference category: company wins
EXTENS:court extends co-determination rights (no=0, yes=1)
PARTLY:co-determination rights neither extended nor restricted (no=0, yes=1)
reference category: court restricts co-determination rights
FIRSTIN:case decided by court of first instance (no=0, yes=1)
APPELC: case decided by Appellate Court (no=0, yes=1)
FEDCIV: case decided by Federal Civil Court (no=0, yes=1)
reference category: Federal Constitutional Court
SINGLE: decision affecting only a single enterprise (no=0, yes=1)
reference category: decision of economy-wide importance
e: error term
2. Description and Coding of the Independent Variables used in the Analysis of
Variance (Tables 5 and 6)
OUTCOME: extension of co-determination (-1)
partly/partly (0)
restriction of codetermination (1)
DECISION: company loss (-1)
both parties win/loose (0)
company win (1)
TIME: days before the event (-1)
event day (0)
days following the event (1)
COURT: court of first instance (1)
Appellate Court (2)
Federal Civil Court (3)
Federal Constitutional Court (4)Table A1
Productivity Effects of Trade Unions
Author(s) Sample/Data Productivity Measure(s) Indicator(s) of WR* Effect of WR*
Addison et al. (1989) 30 two-digit manufacturing Value Added per Union Density Negative, but insignificant
industries organized by 12 Employee
different unions 1983
Kraft (1992) 20 two-digit manufacturing Annual Increase of Union Density Mixed results: significantly
industries organized by 6 Total Factor Pro- Three Dummy-Variables positive in the most
different unions 1970-1987 ductivity Indicating Predominance important sectors (metal
of Metal Workers', and chemical industries),
Chemical Workers', significantly negative
and Wood Workers' Union in other sectors
Lorenz/Wagner (1991) 29 two-digit manufacturing Value Added per Union Density Negative, but insignificant
industries 1985 Employee
Schnabel (1989) Economy-wide time-series Gross Domestic Product Union Density Negative, but insignificant
analysis 1955-1984 per Employee
Schnabel/Wagner (1992) 29 two-digit manufacturing Percentage of Revenues Union Density Positive, but insignificant
industries 1982-1984 Spent on R & D
Percentage of Employees Negative, but insignificant
Working in R & D
Mainusch (1992) 29 two-digit manufacturing Profit Rate Union Density Significantly negative
industries 1983
* WR: Workers' RepresentationTable A2
Productivity Effects of Works Councils
Author(s) Sample/Data Productivity Measure(s) Indicator(s) of WR* Effect of WR*
Addison et al. (1993) 43-54 establishments in Net Profit Before Taxes/ Presence of Works Council Negative, but insignificant
manufacturing industry Fixed Capital
in Lower Saxony and Baden- Log(Value Added) Positive, but insignificant
Württemberg 1990/91** Capital Investment/ Significantly negative
Capital Stock
Net Capital Investment/ Positive, but insignificant
Capital Stock
Log(Wage per Employee) Significantly positive
Average Percentage Wage
Drift Significantly negative
Addison/Wagner (1995) 74 medium and large firms Profits as compared with pro- Presence of Works Council WC: Negative, but insignificant
in Northrhine-Westphalia fits of competitors in the Composite Voice Index VI: Negative, but insignificant
1993 same industry (1 = much
worse ... 5 = much better)
Inroduction of at least one WC: Positive, but insignificant
completely new product in VI: Positive, but insignificant
the previous year (1=yes,
0=no)
Addison/Schnabel/ 926/973 firms in manufac- Profitability (1=high, 0=low), Presence of Works Council DV: Significantly negative
Wagner (1996) turing industry in Lower derived from a categorical (Dummy Variable and Instru- IV: Significantly negative
Saxony 1994** measure (firm´s profit situat- mented Variable)
tion (5=very good ... 1=very
bad); first two grouped as
"high", remaining as "low"
Introduction of a new pro- DV: Positive, but insignificant
duct (1=yes, 0=no) IV: Significantly positive
Introduction of a new pro- DV: Negative, but insignificant
duction process (1=yes, IV: Positive, but insignificant
0=no) in preceeding year
(continued)FitzRoy/Kraft (1985a) 61/62 medium and large firms Profitability Presence of Works Council WC: Significantly negative
in the metal-working industry (Cashflow/Capital Stock) Union Density U: Significantly positive
1977/79 Average Hourly Wage WC: Negative, but insignificant
U: Significantly positive
Salaries per Employee WC: Significantly negative
and Year U: Significantly positive
FitzRoy/Kraft (1985b) cf. FitzRoy/Kraft Value Added per Presence of Works Council WC: Significantly negative
(1985a) Employee Union Density U: Positive, but insignificant
Index of Participation IP: Significantly positive
Index Squared SIP: Significantly negative
FitzRoy/Kraft (1987a) cf. FitzRoy/Kraft Total Factor Productivity Presence of Works Council WC: Significantly negative
(1985a) Union Density U: Significantly positive
FitzRoy/Kraft (1987b) cf. FitzRoy/Kraft Value Added per Employee Presence of Works Council WC: Significantly negative
(1985a) Union Density U: Significantly positive
FitzRoy/Kraft (1990) 57 medium and large firms Innovative Activities Composite Works Council- Significantly negative
in the metal-working indus- (Proportion of Sales Consis- Union Density Index
try 1979 only ting of New Products Intro-
duced Over a Five-Year In-
terval)
Frick (1996a, 1996b), 1616 private sector firms Number of dismissals per Presence of Works Council WC: Significantly negative
Frick/Sadowski (1995) in 1988 100 employees Sectoral Union Density UD: Positive, but insignificant
Number of voluntary WC: Significantly negative
quits per 100 employees UD: Positive, but insignificant
Number of hirings per WC: Negative, but insignificant
100 employees during the UD: Significantly positive
two-year perid May 1985-
April 1987
Kraft (1986) cf. FitzRoy/Kraft Turnover (Dummy-Variable Presence of Works Council WC: Positive, but insignificant
(1985a) High vs. Low According Union Density U: Negative, but insignificant
to Management) Index of Individual Voice IIV: Significantly negative
* WR: Workers' Representation
** Due to missing values, the number of cases varies depending on the specification.Nr. Content Decision
Date
Case
Number
Court Statute Publication
Date
Name and Type
of Enterprise
Further
Deci-
sions
Firm
Specific
(E) /
Industry
Wide (I)
restricting
(r) / exten-
ding (e)
co-
determi-
nation
1 MitbestG Bergbau und Eisen - in
den Montan-Holdinggesellschaften
21.12.1953 3 O 164/53 LG Düsseldorf Montan-
MitbestG,
BetrVG
1952
BB 1954, 60
(20.01.1954)
Mannesmann AG iron/coal r
2 Bestimmung Art. 3 Abs. 2 d Ges. v.
27.4.1967 (BGBl. I S. 505)
verfassungswidrig
10.08.1967 8 Akt E 1/67 LG Dortmund Mitbest.-
Erg.
Gesetz
AG 1967, 295
(Okt. 1967)
Rheinische
Stahlwerke AG
Nr. 4 iron/coal r
3 Mittelbare Wahl von
Arbeitnehmervertretern in den
Aufsichtsrat,
Wahlmännerverfahren,
Wahlordnung
06.02.1968 1 ABR 5/67 BAG BetrVG
1952
DB 1968, 313
(16.2.1968) =
BB 1968, 750
(30.6.1968)
Veba AG I r
4 Art. 3 Abs. 2 des Gesetzes vom
27.4. 1967 verfassungsmäßig
07.05.1969 2 BvL 15/67 BVerfG Montan-
MitbestG
WM 1969, 651
(24.05.1969)
Rheinische
Stahlwerke AG
Nr. 2 iron/coal e
5 Arbeitnehmervertreter im
Aufsichtsrat, Luitpold-Hütte-AG
23.06.1971 4 AR 8/69 LG Nürnberg-
Fürth
Montan-
MitbestG
DB 1971, 1466
(6.8.1971)
Luitpold-Hütte
AG, Reichswerke
Salzgitter
Nr. 6 iron/coal e
6 Befristete Fortgeltung i. d. bisher
dem MitbestG unterliegenden
Unternehmen
03.02.1972 2 Z 100/71 Bay ObLG Montan-
MitbestG
AG 1972, 83
(März 1972)
Luitpold-Hütte-
AG
Nr. 5 I e
7 Mitbestimmung und Beirat einer
AG
13.07.1976 3 O 121/76 LG Köln BetrVG
1952
AG 1976, 329
(Dez. 1976)
Felten und
Guilleaume-AG
E r8 Verfassungsbeschwerde gegen
MitbestG
20.01.1977 1 BvR
441/76
BVerfG Montan-
MitbestG
WM 1977, 254
(26.02.1977) =
DB 1977, 359
(18.2.1977)
alle montan-
mitbestimmten
Unternehmen
I -
9 Übergabe von für die Wahl der
Arbeitnehmervertreter in den AR
benötigten personellen Daten
24.06.1977 3 Ta BV
39/77
LAG Hamm MitbestG DB 1977, 1563
(19.8.1977)
Veba Chemie AG E r
10 Verfassungsmäßigkeit des
MitbestG
08.03.1978 19 W 16/77 OLG
Düsseldorf
MitbestG WM 1978, 381
(15.04.1978) =
DB 1978, 697
(7.4.1978) =
BB 1978, 466
(10.4.1978)
Girmes AG I e
11 Verfassungswidrigkeit, Verstoß des
§ 7 Abs. 1 und 2 MitbestG 1976
gegen Art.9 Abs. 3 GG?
10.04.1978 71 T 60/76 LG Hamburg MitbestG DB 1978, 990
(19.5.1978) =
WM 1978, 528
(20.5.1978) =
BB 1978, 760
(30.5.1978)
Beiersdorf AG Nr. 12 I r
12 Verfassungsmäßigkeit des
MitbestG
01.03.1979 1 BvR 532,
533/77, 1
BvR 419/78
und 1 BvL
21/78
BVerfG MitbestG WM 1979, 389
(7.4.1979) =
DB 1978, 593
(23.3.1979)
Beiersdorf AG Nr. 11 I e
13 Aufsichtsrat, Beschlußfähigkeit,
abschließende Regelung in § 28
MitbestG verneint
23.07.1979 12 O 16/79 LG Mannheim MitbestG DB 1979, 1899
(28.9.1979)
Bilfinger & Berger
Bau AG
Nr. 18, 25 I r
14 Zusammensetzung des
Aufsichtsrats
06.12.1979 2 O
2362/1977c
 LG Bremen MitbestG DB 1980, 349
(15.2.1980)
Kühne & Nagel
AG
Nr. 17 I e15 AG Aufsichtsratsausschüsse;
unzulässige Beschränkung der
Wahlfreiheit durch Satzung und
Geschäftsordnung
16.01.1980 6 O 1171 und
1172/79
LG München MitbestG WM 1980, 689
(14.6.1980) =
DB 1980, 678
(4.4.1980)
Siemens AG Nr. 21, 24 I e
16 Beschlußfähigkeit des
Aufsichtsrates
17.03.1980 64 T 22/79 LG Hamburg MitbestG WM 1980, 688
(14.6.1980) =
AG 1981, 106 =
BB 1980, 959
(10.7.1980)
Hamburg-
Mannheimer Vers.
AG
Nr. 32 I e
17 Zusammensetzung des
Aufsichtsrats
30.04.1980 1 W 3/80(c) OLG Bremen MitbestG DB 1980, 1332
(4./11.7.1980)
Kühne & Nagel
AG
Nr. 14 I r
18 Beschlußfähigkeit des
Aufsichtsrats; MitbestG;
Satzungsänderung
20.06.1980 15 U 171/79 OLG Karlsruhe MitbestG WM 1980,
1182
(11.10.1980) =
DB 1981, 362
(13.2.1981) =
BB 1980, 1232
(30.8.1980)
Bilfinger und
Berger Bau AG
Nr. 13, 25 I e
19 Besetzung von Ausschüssen;
MitbestG;
Aufsichtsratsvorsitzender
04.11.1980 1 O 216/80 LG Hamburg MitbestG WM 1980,
1399
(6.12.1980) =
DB 1981, 359
(13.2.1981) =
BB 1980, 1711
(30.11.1981)
Beiersdorf AG Nr. 26, 29 I r
20 Stichentscheid eines Aus-
schußvorsitzenden
25.03.1981 2 U 91/80 OLG Köln MitbestG WM 1981, 413
(18.04.1981) =
DB 1981, 929
(1.5.1981) =
BB 1981, 631
(20.4.1981)
Dynamit Nobel
AG
Nr. 23 I r21 Aufsichtsrat; Wahl zweier
Stellvertreter; Ausschußbesetzung;
Zweitstimmrecht des
Aufsichtsratsvorsitzenden;
Personalausschuß
29.04.1981 20 U 1464/80 OLG München MitbestG WM 1981, 530
(16.05.1981) =
DB 1981, 1077
(22.5.1981) =
BB 1981, 809
(20.5.1981)
Siemens AG Nr. 24 I r
22 Aufsichtsratswahl der
Arbeitnehmervertreter für
Konzernspitze
24.11.1981 1 ABR 80/79 BAG MitbestG WM 1982, 645
(5.6.1982) =
DB 1982, 755
(9.4. 1982);
Ankündigung in
DB 1981, 2543
(11.12.1981)
Heinrich Industrie-
und Handels-AG
I r
23 Stichentscheid des Vorsitzenden
eines Aufsichtsratsausschusses
25.02.1982 II ZR 102/81 BGH MitbestG WM 1982, 363
(27.3.1982);
Ankündigung in
DB 1982, 534
(12.3.1982)
Dynamit Nobel
AG
Nr. 20 I r
24 Grenzen für Satzungsbestimmungen
einer AG; mehrere Stellvertreter des
Aufsichtsratsvorsitzenden;
Besetzung von
Aufsichtsratsausschüssen
25.02.1982 II ZR 123/81 BGH MitbestG WM 1982, 359
(27.03.1982) =
DB 1982, 742
(9.4.1982);
Ankündigung in
DB 1982, 534
(12.3.1982)
Siemens AG Nr. 15, 21 I partly r /
partly e25 Satzungsbestimmung über
Beschlußfähigkeit des Auf-
sichtsrats
25.02.1982 II ZR 145/80 BGH MitbestG WM 1982, 365
(27.3.1982) =
DB 1982, 747
(9.4.1982);
Ankündigung in
DB 1982, 534
(12.3.1982)
Bilfinger & Berger
Bau AG
Nr. 13, 18 I e
26 Aufsichtsratsausschuß; Be-
setzungsregelung in Geschäfts-
ordnung; weitere Stellvertreter des
AR-Vorsitzenden
23.07.1982 11 U 179/80 OLG Hamburg MitbestG WM 1982,
1090
(23.7.1982) =
DB 1982, 1765
(27.8.1982) =
BB 1982, 1686
(10.10.1982)
Beiersdorf AG Nr. 19, 29 I partly r /
partly e
27 Zur Frage, ob ein 1960 gegründetes
Unternehmen dem Montan-
MitbestG 1951 o. dem MitbestG
1976 unterfällt
24.08.1982 19 W 11/80 OLG
Düsseldorf
Montan-
MitbestG
DB 1982, 1974
(24.9.1982) =
ZIP 1982, 1207
(20.10.1982)
Böhler AG Nr. 28 iron/coal e
28 Anwendungsbereich der Montan-
mitbestimmung
28.02.1983 II ZB 10/82 BGH Montan -
MitbestG
WM 1983, 382
(9.4.1983) =
DB 1983, 1087
(20.5.1983) =
BB 1983, 856
(20.5.1983)
Böhler AG Nr. 27 iron/coal e
29 Besetzung eines Aufsichtsratsaus-
schusses
28.02.1983 II ZR 168/82 BGH MitbestG WM 1983, 446
(23.04.1983)
Beiersdorf AG Nr. 19, 26 E e30 Konzern im Konzern; Bildung des
Aufsichtsrats nach BetrVG o.
MitbestG?
09.11.1983 3 W 25/83 OLG
Zweibrücken
MitbestG WM 1983,
1347
(10.12.1983) =
DB 1984, 107
(13.1.1984)
Streif AG E r
31 Aufsichtsrat, mehrstufiger Konzern 10.11.1983 4 O 3900/83 LG Nürnberg-
Fürth
MitbestG WM 1984, 263
(25.2.1984) =
DB 1983, 2675
(16.12.1983)
Energiever-
sorgung
Oberfranken AG
Bayreuth und
Bamberg
I r
32 Beschlußfähigkeitsregelung für
Aufsichtsrat; MitbestG 1976
04.04.1984 2 W 25/80 OLG Hamburg MitbestG WM 1984,
1154 (1.9.1984)
= DB 1984,
1616 (3.8.1984)
= BB 1984,
1763
(10.10.1984)
Hamburg-
Mannheimer
Versicherungs-AG
Nr. 16 I r
33 Aufsichtsrat; Besetzung eines Vor-
standsausschusses; MitbestG 1976
25.05.1984 11 U 183/83 OLG Hamburg MitbestG WM 1984, 965
(21.07.1984) =
DB 1984, 1567
(27.7.1984)
Beiersdorf AG I partly r /
partly e
34 Konzern im Konzern 19.12.1985 2/6 AktE 1
/85
LG Frankfurt
a.M.
MitbestG WM 1986, 885
(19.07.1986)
VDM AG Nr. 35 E r
35 MitbestG 1976, Aufsichtsrat,
Konzernunternehmen; Konzern im
Konzern
10.11.1986 20 W 27/86 OLG
Frankfurt/M.
MitbestG BB 1986, 2288
(10.12.1986) =
WM 1987, 237
(21.2.1987)
VDM AG Nr. 34 E r
36 Montan-Mitbestimmung,
Einführung in Unternehmen, in dem
sie bisher nicht angewendet worden
ist, verneint
27.07.1988 19 W 10/87 OLG
Düsseldorf
Montan-
MitbestG
DB 1988, 1943
(23.9.1988)
Böhler AG I r37 Aufsichtsrat,
Umstrukturierungsbeschluß,
Unwirksamkeit wegen nicht
ausreichender Information der
Arbeitnehmervertreter
27.06.1989 7 O 214/89 LG Hannover MitbestG DB 1989, 1816
(8.9.1989) =
AG 1989, 448
(1.12.1989)
Pelikan AG E e
38 Montan-Mitbestimmungs-
Ergänzungsgesetz,
Verfassungswidrigkeit
08.01.1991 19 W 3/90 OLG
Düsseldorf
Montan-
Mitbest.-
ErgänzG
DB 1991, 445
(22.2.1991)
Mannesmann AG I e
39 MitbestG, Aufsichtsrat,
Vorstandsausschuß, Besetzung mit
Arbeitnehmervertretern nicht
erforderlich
06.03.1992 11 U 134/91 OLG Hamburg MitbestG DB 1992, 774
(10.4.1992)
Hamburg-
Mannheimer
Versicherungs-AG
Nr. 43 I r
40 Auslaufen durch Betriebsübergang
auf neue Konzernmutter
30.09.1992 18 AktE 1/91 LG Hannover Montan-
MitbestG
WM 1993, 63
(16.01.1993)
Preussag AG Nr. 41 E r
41 MitbestG 1976, Preussag AG,
Übernahme der Salzgitter-AG
22.03.1993 9 W 130/92 OLG Celle MitbestG BB 1993, 957
(20.5.1993)
Preussag AG Nr. 40 E r
42 "Aushebelung" der deutschen
Mitbestimmung durch ausländische
Konzernspitze und deutsche
Zwischenholding?
11.05.1993 2 AktE 1/92 LG Stuttgart MitbestG DB 1993, 1711
(27.8.1993) =
BB 1993, 1541
(10.8.1993)
Charles Vögele
Holding AG
E r
43 Aufsichtsratsausschuß
ausschließlich mit Vertretern d.
Anteilseigner, Ausschaltung der
Mitbestimmung
17.05.1993 II ZR 89/92 BGH MitbestG DB 1993, 1609
(13.8.1993) =
BB 1993, 1468
(30.7.1993)
Hamburg-
Mannheimer
Versicherungs-AG
Nr. 39 I e
44 Mitbestimmung bei
Ausschußbildung im Aufsichtsrat
31.05.1994 HK O 75/93 LG Passau MitbestG AG 1994, 428
(1.9.1994)
Vogt electronic
AG
Nr. 45 I e
45 Mitbestimmung bei
Ausschußbildung im Aufsichtsrat
27.02.1995 23 U 4282/94 OLG München MibestG WM 1995, 978
(3.6.1995)
Vogt electronic
AG
Nr. 44;
rechts-
kräftig
I partly r /
partly e46 Zusammensetzung des
Aufsichtsrats; Zulassung bisheriger
Aufsichtsratsmitglieder als Gäste
10.10.1995 19 W 5/95 OLG
Düsseldorf
BetrVG
1952
WM 1996, 65
(13.1.1996)
Deutsche Babcock
AG
E e